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adjustment in order to generate realistic predictions concerning the transmission of monetary policy. Second, an
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1. Introduction
The appropriate modeling of price stickiness has long been a major concern within the theoret-
ical New-Keynesian literature. Recently, the improved availability of detailed price data paved
the way for an increasing literature analyzing implications of micro price data for the different
theoretical models of price setting. Understanding the exact mechanism underlying price ad-
justment decisions is important because competing models predict divergent effects of monetary
policy and may lead to distinct welfare implications.1 This paper adds to this discussion by
using a new dataset compiled by the Ifo Institute for Economic Research. The dataset consists
of a large panel of monthly firm-level business surveys from January 1991 to January 2006 cov-
ering about 930 German retail firms. In the empirical analysis univariate and bivariate ordered
probit menu cost models are specified and estimated in the spirit of the seminal target-threshold
model by Cecchetti (1986). Within this empirical specification the probability of both price
adjustment and price updating is related to a set of time- and state-dependent regressors. In
particular, this paper contributes to the existing literature on various important dimensions.
First, the determinants of price setting are analysed at the firm-level. Such an analysis has sev-
eral advantages relative to an assessment at the item-level, which can be found in studies that
use individual price records underlying CPI calculations. For instance, a firm-level assessment
may lead to important implications for microfounded macro models. Second and related, rela-
tive to previous empirical studies on price setting the survey data allows matching changes in
firms’ prices to several other firm-characteristics. Thus, the empirical model explicitly captures
the specific state of the individual firms, which is not possible using other types of price data.
Third, because the price data can be linked to input costs on a product group-specific basis,
I am able to explicitly analyze the transmission of price shocks through different production
stages. Fourth, the dataset covers information on firms’ expectations concerning future prices
allowing an explicit evaluation of models concerned with the setting of pricing plans. An ex-
plicit analysis of the determinants of price updating has so far not been forthcoming within the
empirical literature on price setting behaviour in retail.
More specifically, the empirical analysis offered in this paper covers three main issues. First, it
will be assessed whether factors characterizing the economic environment of the firms are signif-
icant determinants for the probability of price adjustment next to time-dependent elements. In
standard time-dependent models firms regularly adjust prices independently of the environment
they are faced with (Taylor, 1980; Calvo, 1983). Therefore, the frequency of price setting is
constant. Contrarily, state-dependent theories assume the timing of price changes to be the
outcome of a profit maximization problem of firms; the probability of price adjustment thus
1For instance, Dotsey et al. (1999) show that prices adjust faster in state-dependent models leading to real
effects of monetary policy that are less pronounced compared to the predictions of time-dependent models. For
a thorough analysis of welfare implications of different models see e.g. Lombardo and Vestin (2008).
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depends on the state of the economy.2 In contrast to time-dependent models, therefore, both
the size and the frequency of price adjustment vary with the state of the economy. Since the
dataset at hand allows to examine the relative importance of the different regressors for the
frequency of price changes it will be analyzed whether macroeconomic indicators like inflation
or changes in the price of raw materials, accumulated since the last price change, or changes
in the institutional environment are important for firms’ price adjustment decision. Moreover,
variables measuring the specific state of the firm such as changes in the overall state of business,
the business volume, the number of orders or the expected business development are included in
the regressions. These latter factors are considered in the analysis because recent price setting
models stress the importance of firm-specific shocks for the price setting process. For instance,
the model of Golosov and Lucas (2007) differentiates between firms’ reaction to firm-specific and
aggregate shocks and include both types of disturbances in a menu cost model. Moreover, im-
perfect information models as, for instance, Mackowiak et al. (2009), emphasize the importance
of idiosyncratic shocks for price adjustment.3 My regression results suggest an important role for
state-dependence; macroeconomic and institutional factors such as the sectoral rate of inflation,
changes in the oil price or increases in the VAT rate are significantly related to the probability
of price adjustment and have economically important effects. Moreover, factors characterizing
the firm-specific environment as well as changes in intermediate input costs have highly signif-
icant effects. Thus, standard time-dependent pricing models predicting an exogenously given
probability of price adjustment are not supported by the results.
The second question addressed is concerned with the price setting mechanism at different pro-
duction stages. The question of whether the retail sector or preceding stages of production are
dominant for the timing of price adjustment can have important implications for modeling price
stickiness.4 In price setting models that explicitly include a production structure, intermediate
inputs raise the degree of price stickiness because the pricing decisions of different firms be-
come strategic complements and thus stickiness ”adds up” through the production chain (Basu,
1995; Nakamura and Steinsson, 2008b). In these models prices of primary goods quickly adjust
to macroeconomic shocks, while prices of goods at later stages of processing show a sluggish
response to aggregate shocks but respond immediately to input price changes. Analyzing the
degree of additional rigidity at the retail level thus helps to evaluate the predictions of these
models. In particular, measures of changes in wholesale and manufacturing prices are related
to the timing of price changes in the retail sector. First, the data generally promote pricing
2See e.g. Caplin and Spulber (1987), Dotsey et al. (1999), Gertler and Leahy (2008) and Golosov and Lucas
(2007).
3The main motivation behind the inclusion of firm-specific factors is to improve the mapping of price setting
features at the micro level into aggregate outcomes of theoretical pricing models by modeling the price setting
process more realistically. The appropriate matching of micro data and aggregate results has been a major
difficulty in modeling price setting. For instance, in the menu cost model of Caplin and Spulber (1987) prices
are adjusted infrequently but still nominal shocks have no effects on the real economy. On the other hand, in
models of imperfect information (Mackowiak and Wiederholt, 2009) monetary shocks have large and persistent
real effects despite of frequent price adjustment. See also Mackowiak and Smets (2008) for a survey.
4See Nakamura (2008) for a discussion.
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models with intermediate inputs where stickiness ”accumulates” through the production chain;
changes in input costs are indeed among the most important determinants for price adjustment.
Second, however, adding lags of input price measures shows that the effect of input cost changes
on the probability of price adjustment in retail is rather persistent. This suggests that there is
some degree of additional rigidity at the retail level, which is in line with empirical results of
Nakamura (2008).
The third main issue analyzed in this paper concerns the updating of future price plans allowing
to assess the plausibility of different sticky plan models. In these frameworks firms set entire
plans prescribing the development of a sequence of future prices instead of individual prices
at every period. The distinction between time- and state-dependence also applies to these
models. On the one hand, in so-called sticky information models delayed price adjustment is
the consequence of information costs that prevent continuous price revisions.5 These models
predict that every period a fixed fraction of firms updates an entire sequence of future prices
implying that the frequency of expected future price changes is constant over time. On the other
hand, the sticky plan model of Burstein (2006) constitutes an example of state-dependent price
updating. In this model firms’ updating of pricing plans is constrained by a menu cost - the
frequency of price updating is thus endogenous and adjusts once accumulated changes in the
economic environment are large enough.6 While, so far, empirical evidence on the mechanism
underlying the formation of pricing plans is scarce for the Euro area7, the dataset at hand
allows to analyze these issues on a firm-specific level. In particular, relating the probability of a
change in expectations of future prices to both time- and state-dependent variables, I evaluate
the predictions of these respective sticky plan models. The results for price expectations are
very similar to those for price realizations with most state-dependent variables turning out to
be highly significant and economically important. This provides evidence in favour of state-
dependent sticky plan models.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives a short review of the literature
related to the issues addressed. In Section 3, the empirical strategy is outlined including a
description of the business survey data, the empirical specification as well as the estimated price
setting equations. In Section 4, the main results as well as robustness checks are given. Section
5 concludes.
5Examples include Bonomo and Carvalho (2004), Caballero (1989) and Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2006). While
in Bonomo and Carvalho (2004) time-dependent price reviewing is due to the simultaneous occurrence of both
menu and information costs, in Mankiw and Reis (2002, 2006) imperfect information is assumed to follow from a
fixed cost of observing the state of the economy. See also Mankiw and Reis (2010) for an overview.
6Related to this model are recent contributions by, for instance, Alvarez et al. (2010) and Bonomo et al. (2010)
modeling the mechanism underlying the price reviewing process. Due the inclusion of both menu and information
costs these models assume state-dependent price reviews.
7A notable exception is the study by Fabiani et al. (2006) summarizing Euro area evidence on the patterns
underlying price setting and reviewing. For the corresponding results for Germany see Stahl (2010). I comment
in the next section on how these studies differs from my approach.
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2. Related Empirical Literature
Within the empirical literature analyzing the relative importance of time- versus state-dependence,
there are three main approaches. The first approach, initiated by the seminal contribution of
Cecchetti (1986) using data on magazine prices, is to analyze individual price records. More
recent studies make use of large sets of price data on a broad range of goods collected by
national statistical offices to calculate the Consumer-/ Producer Price Index (CPI/PPI). Over-
all, however, results from these studies concerning the price adjustment process remain rather
inconclusive. For the U.S., Klenow and Kryvtsov (2008) find that neither time- nor classical
state-dependent frameworks are consistent with micro data features. They suggest that, instead,
models incorporating real rigidities such as economies of scope (Midrigan, 2007) or a Poisson
distribution of idiosyncratic shocks (Gertler and Leahy, 2008), are better able to reflect the size
and frequency of price changes observed in the data. Nakamura and Steinsson (2008a) find evi-
dence for the importance of state-dependence as the frequency of price changes strongly reacts
to inflation. A recent paper by Eichenbaum et al. (2010) stresses the importance of costs for
the adjustment of ”reference prices” using price data from a large U.S. retailer thus providing
evidence for state-dependent pricing. For Belgian CPI data, Aucremanne and Dhyne (2005)
show that while time-dependent factors are most important for price setting, state-dependent
variables such as the rate of inflation, accumulated since the last price change, are significant
as well. Furthermore, Dhyne et al. (2006) and Vermeulen et al. (2007), summarizing empirical
findings of the Inflation Persistence Network (IPN) using CPI and PPI data respectively, find
support for both time- and state-dependent elements for the Euro area. Corresponding studies
for Germany include Stahl (2010) for producer prices and Hoffmann and Kurz-Kim (2006) for
consumer prices.
A second stream of literature makes use of one-time firm-surveys asking firms explicitly for the
timing of and reasons for price adjustment. Seminal work by Blinder (1991) for the U.S. has
been followed by interview studies on European firms conducted by the IPN and summarized
by Fabiani et al. (2006). The latter study finds that the majority of firms in the Euro area
adjust prices taking into account state-dependent elements. For Germany, Stahl (2010) analyzes
the results from such a one-time survey conducted by the Ifo institute for the manufacturing
sector. A final approach has been to use business survey data on prices and other firm-specific
variables. Lein (2010), using survey data of Swiss manufacturing firms, documents evidence
for the importance of factors affecting the firm-specific environment, and in particular those
related to production costs, for the timing of price adjustment. Moreover, for France Loupias
and Sevestre (2010) finds evidence for the importance of intermediate input and labor costs
as well as sectoral inflation for price setting in manufacturing. For the retail sector, such a
business survey analysis has so far not been forthcoming. All in all, while the above-mentioned
studies contain some evidence in favour of state-contingent price setting, they lack a thorough
empirical assessment of the mechanism underlying the price updating. One exception is the
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study by Fabiani et al. (2006) that also contains evidence on patterns underlying price reviews
in the Euro area. One result from this Euro area study is that, similar as for realized price
changes, about two thirds of all firms apply state-dependent strategies when reviewing their
prices. Corresponding results for Germany are presented in Stahl (2010); according to the one-
time survey conducted by the Ifo institute about 40% of German manufacturing firms report
to review their prices following time-dependent rules only. Relative to this interview approach
the business survey dataset not only allows a deeper analysis of the different factors underlying
price updating but also a more indirect assessment, which might mitigate measure measurement
error.
As far as the transmission of price shocks through the production chain is concerned, theoretical
models including an explicit production structure suggest that price stickiness ”adds up” through
the chain of processing (Blanchard, 1983; Basu, 1995; Huang and Liu, 2001; Nakamura and
Steinsson, 2008b). So far, empirical evidence on these models’ implications are rather mixed.
Clark (1999) estimates a VAR model for the U.S. to analyze the effects of a monetary shock on
prices set by firms across different stages of production and finds that input prices move much
faster in response to a monetary shock than output prices at early stages of processing. The
difference between input and output prices shrinks for subsequent stages suggesting that the
retail sector does not add additional stickiness but that price rigidity rather accumulates. On
the other hand, Nakamura (2008) studies the comovement of prices across products and firms
using detailed U.S. price data and finds some evidence for retail firms playing the dominant
role in the timing of price adjustment as retail-level shocks seem to drive a wedge between the
observed price level and costs at the wholesale level.
3. Empirical Strategy
3.1. Description and Discussion of the Business Survey Dataset
The dataset consists of a large panel of business surveys for the retail sector conducted by the
Ifo Institute for Economic Research.8 A summary of the variables used is given in Table 1. The
econometric sample constructed from this dataset covers about 930 retail firms. Because some of
the firms responded to several questionnaires for different product groups, the observation unit
is firm-products leading to a total of 2,017 observation units. The sample runs from January
1991 to January 2006.9 As firms take part in the survey on a voluntary basis, not every firm
responded every month resulting in an unbalanced dataset. To obtain a workable sample, I
8For more details on the survey data, see Appendix A and Becker and Wohlrabe (2008).
9Even though the micro survey data is available from 1990:01 the econometric sample constructed from the
data starts in 1991:01 since the data for the sector-specific rate of inflation is not available prior to this date.
Moreover, the sample only includes observations up to 2006:01 to avoid a break due to a significant change of the
questionnaires afterwards.
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drop observation units with fewer than six data points. Because at the observation unit level
the time elapsed since the last price adjustment is unknown before the first price change the
data has been left-censored by dropping all observation units prior to the first price change
for the respective firms. Moreover, in order to be able to correctly calculate the cumulative
changes in the macroeconomic variables since the last price adjustment observations following
(preceding) the missing observations are dropped until the next (previous) price change.10 After
these manipulations the sample contains a total of about 78,000 observations. Each retail firm
can be allocated to one of the following sectors according to the 4-digit WZ08 classification
of the Federal Bureau of Statistics: Automobile, Food and Beverages, Communication and
Information Technology, Household Products, Recreational Products, Other Industrial Products
and Products not in Store. Thus, the composition of the products is similar to that of the
consumer price index. Missing items relative to the CPI are services including housing rents as
well as Energy goods such as oil products as well as gas and electricity.
Table 1: Dependent and Independent Variables
Dependent variable
prvpm price versus previous month
exppr price expectation for coming three months
Firm-specific variables
busvol business volume versus previous month
statebus state of business (appraisal)
ords orders versus previous year (expectation)
busdev business development (expectation)
Wholesale/manufacturing prices
pr ws net price incr. in wholesale (sector-specific)
pr m net price incr. in manufact. (weighted average)
Macroeconomic variables
inflation cumulative sectoral rate of inflation
exchrate cumulative change in Euro/USD exchange rate
oil cumulative change in the oil price
Institutional dummies
Euro introduction of Euro (+/- 3 months)
vat change in vat rate (+/- 3 months)
”Time-dependent” variables
taylor j Taylor dummy - price change j months ago
winter/summer/fall seasonal dummies
Amongst other questions, firms are asked whether they changed the price of their products in the
last month (denoted prvpmit for firm i in period t). The answers are coded as 1 (”increased”), 0
(”not changed”) and -1 (”decreased”). Moreover, firms are asked whether they expect to change
10Results are robust to only dropping the observations following the missing data point until the next price
change. Moreover, the main results still hold if missing observations are replaced by 0. This implies the assumption
that firms did in fact not change their price in the months they did not report. While this assumption seems
reasonable for a dataset that is dominated by observation 0 for the price variable, it is of course rather strong.
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their prices in the coming three months; possible answers are again ”increase”, ”decrease” and
”no changes”. Further questions considered in the analysis include variables concerning the
state of the firm. For instance, firms are asked how they appraise the current state of business
(statebusit). Moreover, there are questions related to their business volume (busvolit) versus the
previous month as well as their expectations concerning their orders for the next three months
relative to the same month in the previous year (ordersit). Finally, firms are asked about their
expectations concerning the overall business development in the coming six months (busdevit).
Relative to other datasets, the survey dataset provides several advantages. First, the business
surveys contain information on price changes of every individual firm and, at the same time,
on a range of different firm-specific variables. While quantitative price data underlying the CPI
give precise results on the frequency and size of price changes, it is hard to disentangle which
particular factors explain price setting because the individual price data cannot be matched
with firm-specific variables. Second, the business survey data contain information on firms’
price expectations allowing to analyze the price reviewing process, which is not possible using
item-level price data. Third, the dataset allows to thoroughly analyze the effects of changes in
the input prices on the probability of price adjustment for the respective stages of production.
Such an assessment has not been forthcoming within the previous literature. A fourth advantage
of the data is that firms are not asked directly on their pricing strategies as in one-time interview
studies conducted by, for instance, Blinder (1991) for the U.S. and Fabiani et al. (2006), for the
Euro area. Such an interview method may lead to biased responses as firms might be unwilling
to respond truthfully to questions regarding their pricing strategies. Moreover, in contrast to the
one-time interviews firms are asked every month, which better reveals their pricing behaviour
over time. Despite these advantages it should be kept in mind that due to the qualitative nature
of the questionnaires the data does not allow to make an inference concerning the size of price
changes.11 Thus, all price changes are implicitly assumed to be equally sized in this analysis. A
further limitation is that the survey data contains both single- and multi-product firms without
providing any information on how the latter firms answer the question concerning their prices.
This problem is mitigated by the fact that firms are asked to fill in different questionnaires for
their respective product groups. Nevertheless, firms still have to cluster the price development
of several sub-products within the same category resulting in a certain degree of aggregation
of individual prices. However, a recent meta-study on the survey provides some details on
how multi-product firms tend to fill in the questionnaires; in particular, the study reports that
approximately half of the firms indicate the average price development of all of their products,
while the other half report prices of their most important commodities.12
11However, constructing an aggregate time series from the micro data shows that the price data quite closely
reflects movements in the official aggregate price indices. Figure B5 in Appendix B displays the comovement
of the aggregated net price increase calculated from the survey data with the official German retail price index
constructed by the Federal Bureau of Statistics. Moreover, more disaggregated time series for the respective
sectors clearly comove with the official indices, as shown in Figure B6 in the Appendix.
12See Appendix A for more details.
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3.2. Descriptive Statistics
Table 2 shows the conditional and unconditional probabilities of observing a price change as
well as a change in expectations of future prices, respectively. The conditional probabilities can
be written as
pij(P ) = Prob(Pt = i|xt = j)
pij(E[P ]) = Prob(Et[Pt+k] = i|xt = j),
with i ∈ (−1, 0, 1) and j ∈ (−1, 0, 1). Pt denotes the reported price realization in a given month,
while Et[Pt+k] indicates the reported change in price expectations. Since firms report their
price expectations for the coming three months, k ∈ (1, 2, 3). xt denotes the realization of the
respective firm-characteristic in the same month. First, the table reveals that price increases
are somewhat more likely than price decreases; the unconditional probabilities of observing a
price increase and decrease are 26.3% and 22.4%, respectively, which is not surprising given a
positive inflation environment. For price expectations this asymmetry between increases and
decreases is more pronounced (31.7% versus 14.6%). Second, the table shows the respective
probabilities conditional on observing changes in the other firm-specific variables introduced
above. In most of the cases improvements in the variables describing the state of the firm lead
to a higher probability of observing a price increase compared to the probability of a price
decrease, while in the case of deteriorations of the firm-specific factors, the probability of a price
decrease is higher. This pattern is to be expected if the firm-specific situation depends positively
on the demand situation facing the firm.13 For instance, the probability of observing both an
improvement in the perceived state of business and a price increase is more than twice as large
as that of a ”good” state of business and a price decrease (5.2% versus 2%). Similarly, a price
decrease is more likely than a price increase if the state of business is ”bad” (13.2% versus 8.6%).
A similar pattern can be observed for most of the other variables. In the case of a decreased
business volume, the probability of a price increase is higher than that of a price decrease; the
observation that both increases and decreases in the business volume lead to a higher chance
of observing a price increase is somewhat surprising. This observation suggest that the effects
of improvements on the one hand and deteriorations in the state of business on the other hand
may sometimes be driven by different underlying mechanisms. These asymmetries should be
accounted for in the empirical analysis. Conditional probabilities show a largely similar pattern
for price expectations. As for price realizations, the respective probabilities of a price increase
and decrease conditional on observing a decrease in the business volume are somewhat surprising.
Moreover, in the cases of deteriorations in the state of business and in orders, respectively, price
increases are slightly more likely than price decreases. However, the difference is rather small.
All the other conditional probabilities are in line with the expected pattern.
13However, it is of course not clear ex ante whether considerations related to the demand situation on the one
hand or supply-side factors on the other hand are dominant when firms answer questions related to their specific
state of business.
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Table 3 offers some insights on the correlation between realized price changes and price expecta-
tions reporting the probability of observing a price change conditional on changes in expectations
of future prices. As the upper panel of the table shows, there is a clear positive relation between
the two variables; conditional on observing an increase in the expected future price, the proba-
bility of a realized price increase is highest (16.5% versus 11.1% and 4.1% for observing no price
change and a price decrease, respectively). Similarly, the combination of a decrease in both price
realizations and expectations is much more likely than observing both a decrease in expected
prices and an increase in the realized price (9.0% versus 1.0%). The lower three panels of Table
3 show the probabilities of observing a price change conditional on lags of price expectations.
Since firms are asked to report their expectations concerning the coming three months, probabil-
ities for lags one, two and three are reported. The conditional probabilities reported in the table
suggest that in most cases, firms act as previously expected. Conditional on having expected
a price increase, the probabilities of actually observing a realized price increase one, two and
three periods later are highest (17.2%, 16.0% and 14.9%, respectively). A similar pattern can
be observed for expected price decreases. This suggests that changes in price expectations can
indeed be interpreted as the setting of price plans by firms.
Table 2: Conditional and Unconditional Probabilities
Pt Et[Pt+k]
1 0 -1 1 0 -1
unconditional 0.263 0.514 0.224 0.317 0.537 0.146
statebus good 0.052 0.065 0.020 0.060 0.065 0.013
normal 0.125 0.238 0.072 0.149 0.244 0.041
bad 0.086 0.211 0.132 0.108 0.228 0.092
busvol higher 0.099 0.167 0.051 0.124 0.160 0.033
as high 0.068 0.147 0.041 0.077 0.150 0.029
lower 0.116 0.202 0.109 0.140 0.216 0.070
orders higher 0.036 0.045 0.021 0.046 0.044 0.012
as high 0.146 0.282 0.079 0.171 0.295 0.041
lower 0.081 0.187 0.124 0.100 0.198 0.093
busdev better 0.042 0.058 0.027 0.052 0.060 0.015
as good 0.154 0.308 0.094 0.182 0.327 0.047
worse 0.066 0.148 0.103 0.083 0.150 0.084
The left panel of the table presents the conditional and unconditional probabilities
of observing a price increase (1), decrease (-1) and no price change (0). The right
panel reports the corresponding probabilities for observing an increase (1), decrease
(-1) or no change (0) in price expectations for the coming three months. Since firms
report expectations for the coming three months, k ∈ (1, 2, 3). The sample period is
1991:01-2006:01.
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Table 3: Conditional Probabilities of Price Change Given Price Expectations
Pt
1 0 -1
Et[Pt+k] Increase 0.165 0.111 0.041
No change 0.088 0.356 0.093
Decrease 0.010 0.047 0.090
Et−1[Pt−1+k] Increase 0.172 0.118 0.023
No change 0.066 0.393 0.084
Decrease 0.007 0.041 0.097
Et−2[Pt−2+k] Increase 0.160 0.126 0.022
No change 0.067 0.397 0.088
Decrease 0.011 0.040 0.089
Et−3[Pt−3+k] Increase 0.149 0.134 0.025
No change 0.072 0.381 0.100
Decrease 0.017 0.045 0.077
The table presents the probabilities of observing a price increase
(1), decrease (-1) and no price change (0) conditional on price
expectations in a given month as well as one, two and three
months ago, respectively. Since firms report expectations for
the coming three months, k ∈ (1, 2, 3). The sample period is
1991:01-2006:01.
Finally, Figure 1 provides some aggregated statistics calculated from the micro data. The upper
panel of the figure plots the frequency of price changes calculated from the business survey data
as well as the rate of retail price inflation. The figure reveals that the frequency of price ad-
justment is not completely stable but seems to comove with the rate of inflation over time. The
lower panel of the figure displays the frequency of price increases and decreases, respectively,
as well as the rate of retail price inflation. The figure clearly shows the comovement between
the rate of inflation and the frequency of price increases. Thus, both figures suggest that the
frequency of price changes is not invariant over time as predicted by time-dependent theories
but that it seems to depend on the overall inflation environment.
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Figure 1: Frequency of Price Changes and Retail Price Inflation
Both figures display year-on-year changes of the retail price index. The frequency of price
changes as well as the frequency of price increases and decreases enter as 12-month moving
averages.
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3.3. Econometric Model
The dependent price variables prvpmit and expprit have three discrete outcomes: -1 for a price
decrease (expected price decrease), 0 if there is no price change (if no price change is expected)
and +1 for a price increase (expected price increase). A latent variable specification is assumed to
underly the data generating process with an unobserved quantitative price variable y∗it depending
on a set of explanatory variables:
y∗it = x
′
itβ + uit. (1)
Following the target-threshold approach suggested by Cecchetti (1986) a menu cost interpreta-
tion is applied to this specification. In particular, a fixed cost of price adjustment is assumed
that prevents firms from changing prices every period. To derive an econometric specification I
assume the following observation rule for the observed discrete price variable yit:
yit =

−1 if y∗it ≤ α1
0 if α1 ≤ y∗it ≤ α2
1 if α2 < y
∗
it
, (2)
where α1 and α2 are thresholds assumed to be invariant across time and units of observation.
Thus, according to this model, the price is increased as soon as the latent price variable y∗it
exceeds threshold α2, the price is decreased if y
∗
it is below threshold α1 and the price remains
unchanged if the unobserved price variable stays within the cutoff-points. The model is estimated
by means of an ordered probit specification. Since the latent variable can be interpreted as
deviation of the actual price from the desired optimal price, this ordinal interpretation of the
dependent variable applies here.14 For instance, a high sectoral rate of inflation implies that
the realized price is likely to be below the optimal price. Thus, adjustment decision 1 (price
increase) is preferred to 0 (no price change), which in turn is preferred to -1 (price decrease).15
Additionally, a bivariate specification is estimated in order to control for a possible correlation
between the process of price setting and price updating. Arguably, a firm’s decision to change
its price depends on it’s expectations of the future price development. A specification that
controls for this correlation leads to a more efficient estimation (Cameron and Trivedi, 2007). In
particular, since both dependent variables have three outcome possibilities, a bivariate ordered
probit model is estimated. The probability model can be derived from the following latent
variable specification:
14Furthermore, the difference between the thresholds can be interpreted to relate to a menu cost; the higher the
fixed cost of changing the price, the larger is the difference between the cutoff-points and the underlying latent
variable has to take on more extreme values in order for a price change to occur.
15However, to account for possible asymmetries between price increases and decreases, respectively, I addition-
ally estimate the model separately for these respective outcomes using a conditional logit specification. Results
are given in Section 4.5.
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y∗1it = x
′
1itβ1 + 1it (3)
y∗2it = x
′
2itβ2 + γy
∗
1it + 2it,
where β1 and β2 are vectors of unknown parameters and γ is an unknown scalar. 1i and 2i are
error terms that are assumed to be distributed as bivariate standard normal with correlation ρ
(Sajaia, 2008). The observation rules for the dependent variables y1it and y2it are analogous to
equation (2).
Both models are estimated without the explicit inclusion of individual-specific effects. First,
to account for observable heterogeneity, sector-specific dummy variables are included to the set
of regressors. Moreover, due to the firm-specific nature of the dataset at hand, arguably, a
large extent of firm heterogeneity is already captured by some of the regressors (Lein, 2010). To
mitigate the remaining problem of unobserved heterogeneity, I employ the Mundlak-Chamberlain
approach of correlated random effects and assume the latent variable specification to take on
the following form: y∗jit = xjitβj +αi + ujit, where j = (1, 2) indicates the respective dependent
variable and αi are unobserved individual-specific effects. Following e.g. Mundlak (1978), αi
is assumed to be related to observed characteristics in the model according to: αi = x¯
′
jia + ζi,
where ζi ∼ iid Normal and independent of xjit and ujit. To implement this approach, a vector
of firm-specific means of the individual-specific variables is added to the set of regressors.
3.4. Price Setting Equations
Following, for instance, Aucremanne and Dhyne (2005), x′iβ in equation (1) represents a mix of
time- and state-dependent variables. For the empirical analysis of price setting, the following
four specifications are estimated:
y∗it(1) = β1Iit + β2D
s
it + β3D
t
it + uit
y∗it(2) = β1Iit + β2Macit + β3D
s
it + β4D
t
it + β5D
i
it + uit
y∗it(3) = β1Iit + β2Macit + β3Pit + β4D
s
it + β5D
t
it + β6D
i
it + uit
y∗it(4) = β1Iit + β2Macit + β3Pit + β4lPit + β5D
s
it + β6D
t
it + β7D
i
it + uit.
Estimating specification (1) it will be analyzed whether next to time dependent variables mea-
sures reflecting the state of the firm have a significant effect on the probability of price ad-
justment. Iit denotes a vector of the firm-specific variables described in the previous section.
Because the descriptive evidence explained above points to asymmetric effects of improvements
and deteriorations in the respective variables, two different dummies are constructed of all of
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them.16 The first dummy, labeled +, equals 1 if there is an increase or if the situation is good,
respectively, and 0 otherwise. The second dummy, labeled −, equals 1 if there is a decrease or if
the situation is bad and 0 otherwise. Furthermore, a set of time-dependent variables, indicated
by Dtit, is added to the specification. To investigate whether firms in the dataset employ Taylor-
type pricing, Taylor dummies are constructed indicating that the last price change occurred a
fixed period ago. Studies on the frequency of price changes as, for instance, Hoffmann and Kurz-
Kim (2006) for Germany show that there are spikes in hazard rates at six, 12, 18 and 24 months.
Therefore, dummy variables are defined accordingly as Taylor6it, Taylor12it, Taylor18it and
Taylor24it. Furthermore, seasonal dummies are constructed to examine whether the probability
of repricing according to fixed time intervals is increased. As is often stressed in the empirical
literature on price setting, a large degree of heterogeneity is observed both between and within
product groups. Observable differences between sectors are accounted for by including sector-
specific dummy variables, indicated by Dsit. As explained before, a vector Mit of firm-specific
averages of the individual-specific variables is added to account for unobserved heterogeneity.
To analyze the importance of the aggregate state of the economy for price setting, a vector of
macroeconomic variables, indicated by Macit, is included in the set of regressors. In standard
menu cost models the likelihood of price adjustment depends on the distance of the actual to
the optimal price. Because the optimal price itself varies with the state of the economy, this
distance depends on changes in macroeconomic factors, accumulated since the last price change.
Hence, cumulative values of all macroeconomic variables since the last price adjustment are
considered.17 Furthermore, a set of dummy variables, Diit, controlling for important institutional
events is added. This leads to the augmented specification (2). According to, for instance,
Dotsey et al. (1999), an increase in inflation leads to a decline in relative prices of individual
firms which should increase the probability of repricing. Thus, the cumulative sectoral rates
of inflation since the last price change are included as regressors.18 Furthermore, a measure
of cumulative changes in the oil price is included to account for changes in raw material costs
related to global demand or supply shocks. Moreover, the cumulative Euro/USD exchange rate
is added to capture changes in foreign demand. The vector of macroeconomic variables can thus
be characterized by the following expression: Macit = [∆
cumP jit, ∆
cumP oilit , ∆
cumE
€/$
it ]
′, where
P jit indicates the price level for sector j, P
oil
it is the oil price and E
€/$
it stands for the Euro/USD
16Endogeneity does not seem to be a problem when using the firm-specific variables as regressors; results are
robust to including these variables in first lags as well as to using an instrumental variables estimation. See
Section 4.5 for details.
17Card and Sullivan (1988) show that cumulative variables may lead to endogeneity issues and thus to biased
estimators because they can be expressed as xit = 1 + (1− yit−1)xit−1. Thus, to account for possible endogeneity
problems associated with these variables the model is additionally estimated by including the first individual
observation of the dependent variable as an additional regressor, as has been suggested by Wooldridge (2005) and
applied by Loupias and Sevestre (2010). Results, which are available upon request, are robust to this modification.
18The inflation rates for the six respective retail sectors are obtained from the Federal Bureau of Statistics and
are matched with the survey data according to the WZ08 classification. I include values that are lagged by one
period to avoid possible endogeneity problem that may result at this degree of disaggregation. As shown in the
subsection on robustness checks, results are similar if the cumulative rate of consumer price inflation rate is used
instead of the measures of sectoral inflation.
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exchange rate.19 Furthermore, a set of dummies reflecting important institutional events (Diit)
is added to the price setting equation. Events that might influence the decision to adjust prices
are the introduction of the Euro in 2002 as well as the increases in the value added tax in 1993
and 1998. The dummies take on the value 1 in the month of the change as well as in the previous
and following three months.
In order to shed more light on how price shocks are transmitted through the chain of produc-
tion, variables measuring changes in input prices are included in the specification. Moreover,
adding lags of these variables allows to analyze the length of the adjustment process to input
price changes. In specifications (3) and (4) Pit indicates a vector of input price variables. Both
wholesale and manufacturing price developments are considered, because retail firms use prod-
ucts of both sectors as inputs.20 For the construction of the input price measure, business survey
data for the wholesale and manufacturing sector is used. Within these sectors, firms are asked
similar questions regarding their price development as compared to the retail sector.21 As far as
data for the wholesale sector is concerned, as both datasets are classified according to the same
internal classification scheme of the Ifo institute, wholesale price data could exactly be matched
to the retail data on a product group-specific basis22 The frequency of net price increases in
the wholesale sector was calculated as an average of all firms of a particular three-digit product
category for every month in every year. Thus, for every product category, the frequency of net
price increases was constructed according to:
Fws,+jt =
∑nj
i=1 y
ws,+
ijt −
∑nj
i=1 y
ws,−
ijt∑nj
i=1 y
ws,+
ijt +
∑nj
i=1 y
ws,−
ijt +
∑nj
i=1 y
ws,0
ijt
,
where Fws,+jt denotes the frequency of net price increases of a particular product-group j within
the wholesale sector, yws,+ijt and y
ws,−
ijt indicate a price increase and a price decrease of firm i
belonging to sector j at time t, respectively, and yws,0ijt indicates that the price was not changed.
These ”time series” for the different product groups could then be matched to every retail firm
belonging to the same category. Such an exact match was possible for about 67% of the retail
firms. For manufacturing prices, unfortunately, a sector-specific match of input prices was not
possible because this dataset has been coded differently. To construct a measure of the price
development, therefore, a weighted average of net price increases of all sectors was constructed
19Arguably, this set of macroeconomic variables only constitutes a certain selection of relevant factors and may
not cover the entire macroeconomic environment facing the firms. To take account of this possibility I additionally
estimate specification (2) including time-specific effects instead of the vector Macit. More details and regression
results are presented in Section 4.5.
20Because according to the input-output table of the Federal Bureau of Statistics retail products make up for
only about 1% of all inputs used by the wholesale sector, assuming the wholesale price variable to be exogenous
in the retail price equation seems reasonable.
21See Becker and Wohlrabe (2008).
22According to the internal Ifo classification scheme, the term ”product group” implies an ordering according
to the first three digits of the five-digit product code.
16
for every time unit: Fm,+t =
∑J
j=1 ωjF
m,+
jt . F
ws,+
jt denotes the weighted average of net price
increases within the manufacturing sector and Fm,+jt indicates the frequency of net price increases
within each particular manufacturing sector. ωj indicates the respective weight for each sector.
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4. Results
4.1. Time- vs. State-Dependence
Results for the baseline price setting equation (1), the specification including aggregate variables
(2) as well as the equation adding intermediate input costs (3) are shown in Table 4. The
table reports marginal effects for the outcomes 1 (price increase) and -1 (price decrease) as
well as robust standard errors. First, in specification (1) all time-dependent variables have
significant effects on the probability of price adjustment. For instance, a firm that raised it’s
price exactly four quarters ago faces a 1% higher probability of a price increase in a given
period.24 Furthermore, all seasonal dummies are significant. For example, compared to the
benchmark season spring, a price increase is 3.6% more likely during winter and 2.4% less
likely during summer. Next to the time-dependent variables, most of the firm-specific measures
show highly significant effects and have the expected signs. A decrease in the state of business
decreases the probability of observing a price increase by 6.5%, while it increases the likelihood
of a price decrease by 6.2%. Similarly, decreases in the expected business development and in
orders decrease (increase) the probability of a price increase (decrease). Moreover, as expected,
improvements in the state of business and increases in the business volume increase (decrease)
the likelihood of a price increase (decrease); marginal effects are similar as compared to decreases
in the firm-specific variables ranging from 3.2% to 5.4%. However, the direction of the effect
of a decrease in business volume is rather surprising leading to a higher likelihood of a price
increase (and vice versa). Nevertheless, this result is in line with the descriptive evidence on
the conditional probabilities explained in the last section reporting a higher probability of a
price increase compared to a decrease conditional on observing a lower business volume. This
implies that this surprising result is indeed driven by the data and not by the econometric model
employed. Moreover, the signs of the marginal effects for increases in orders and improvements
in the expected business development are surprising; however, the effect of the former dummy
is insignificant, while the marginal effect of the latter is rather small. Overall, the statistically
and economically significant effects of the firm-specific variables leads to the tentative conclusion
that state-dependence is important for the pricing behaviour of German retail firms.
Adding the cumulative macroeconomic variables as well as the institutional dummies (columns
four and five in Table 4) further reinforces the evidence in favour of state-dependence. The
23The respective weights are chosen according to their respective usage within the retail sector given in the
official input-output table of the Federal Bureau of Statistics.
24Taylor dummies indicating that the last price change was six and 18 months ago, respectively, are also
significant but not shown in the table for reasons of space.
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effects of cumulative changes of the sectoral rates of inflation as well as the oil price are highly
significant and show the expected signs. In particular, an increase in the sector-specific rate
of inflation, accumulated since the last price adjustment, by one percent raises the probability
of a price increase by 2.7%, while it reduces the chance of observing a price decrease by 2.5%.
Moreover, a unit increase in the cumulative change of the oil price leads to a higher (lower)
likelihood of a price increase (decrease). Furthermore, a depreciation of the Euro/USD exchange
rate increases the likelihood of observing a price increase, which is in line with economic theory
since a lower value of the Euro may increase export demand. However, the effect is insignificant.
Moreover, changes in the institutional environment are significantly related to the timing of
price adjustment. More specifically, the dummy indicating increases in the VAT rate has a
particularly high effect raising (lowering) the probability of a price increase (decrease) by 8.2%
(6.4%). Similarly, the introduction of the Euro led more firms to increase their prices, while the
fraction of firms decreasing prices was significantly reduced. As can be seen in the table, the
firm-specific variables are robust to the inclusion of the macroeconomic factors. Furthermore,
while the time-dependent variables are generally still significant, the seasonal dummies show
somewhat reduced marginal effects.
Columns six and seven of Table 4 show regression results of specification (3) that includes changes
in intermediate input costs. Both measures are highly significant and have the expected effects.
An increase in the measure of manufacturing prices by one unit increases the likelihood of a
price increase by 4.5% and reduces the chance to observe a price decrease by 3.5%. An increase
in the sector-specific measure of wholesale prices is particularly effective leading even to a 32.8%
higher and a 25.8% lower likelihood of a price increase and decrease, respectively. As before,
firm-specific variables are robust to the inclusion of the intermediate input cost measures. While
the Taylor dummies are robust, too, interestingly, the seasonal dummies are now insignificant.
This suggests that in specifications (1) and (2) these variables capture part of the variations in
intermediate input costs. Once these latter effects are controlled for, the importance of seasonal
effects vanishes indicating that the seasonality observed after estimating specifications (1) and
(2) is in fact not due to time-dependent pricing behaviour.
All in all, the results reported in Table 4 suggest that while elements such as Taylor pricing
are relevant for the repricing probability of retail firms, a pure time-dependent representation of
pricing is clearly rejected. Most of the factors characterizing both the firm-specific and aggregate
state of the firms are highly significant and have economically important effects on the price
adjustment decision. Moreover, seasonality is only present in the data as long as intermediate
input costs are not accounted for. This finding reveals that empirical results reported in the
literature might be misleading as long as the specification does not control for such state-
dependent factors.
4.2. Intermediate Inputs
Regression results of specification (3) show that intermediate input prices are generally important
determinants for price adjustment of retail firms. In price setting equation (4) six lags of the
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respective input prices have been added to the specification in order to analyze the speed of
price adjustment to input cost disturbances. Regression results are shown in Table 5. As far as
the product group-specific ”wholesale price index” is concerned, almost all lags are significant
and have economically important effects. This suggests that on average, retail firms do not
react immediately to a wholesale price change but that the adjustment process is only complete
after several months. Adding up the marginal effects for the significant lags yields cumulative
effects of a unit increase in the wholesale price measure on the probability of observing a price
increase and decrease of 9.7% and 7.4%, respectively. Similarly, adjustment to manufacturing
price changes seems to be sluggish; all lags of the manufacturing price index are significant. The
accumulated effect is about 6.9% and 9.1% for price increases and decreases, respectively.
Two main conclusions emerge from these estimation results. First, intermediate input prices
are important determinants of price adjustment in retail. This suggests that in order to make
realistic predictions concerning the price adjustment process and hence the effects of monetary
policy on the real economy price setting theories should explicitly model the transmission of
price changes through the production chain. This is done by, for instance, Basu (1995), Huang
and Liu (2001) and Nakamura and Steinsson (2008b). Second, however, changes in input costs
are not fully reflected in the repricing probability on impact. Instead, intermediate goods price
changes have an effect on the price adjustment decision within the retail sector for several
months following the change. This suggests that there is ”additional rigidity” at the retail level,
which is not in line with the predictions of the above-mentioned price setting models. Instead,
these models imply that price stickiness ”adds up” through the production chain and thus, at
the last stage of processing, prices adjust immediately to cost changes at the preceding stage.
By contrast, the regression results shown in Table 5 are in line with the empirical study by
Nakamura (2008) showing that price stickiness at the retail level is dominant for the timing of
retail price changes relative to the preceding production stages.
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Table 4: Ordered Probit Regressions I
(1) (2) (3)
Increases Decreases Increases Decreases Increases Decreases
statebus− -0.065*** 0.062*** -0.055*** 0.052*** -0.031*** 0.025***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
busvol− 0.024*** -0.022*** 0.019*** -0.017*** -0.002 0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
orders− -0.036*** 0.034*** -0.033*** 0.031*** -0.031*** 0.025***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004)
busdev− -0.027*** 0.026*** -0.030*** 0.029*** -0.034*** 0.028***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
statebus+ 0.037*** -0.032*** 0.032*** -0.027*** 0.013** -0.010**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
busvol+ 0.054*** -0.048*** 0.049*** -0.043*** 0.039*** -0.030***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
orders+ -0.005 0.004 -0.006 0.006 -0.031*** 0.027***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007)
busdev+ -0.018*** 0.018*** -0.017*** 0.017*** -0.037*** 0.032***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
inflation 0.027*** -0.025*** 0.018*** -0.014***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
oil 0.053*** -0.049*** 0.062*** -0.049***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.011)
exchrate 0.012 -0.011 0.013 -0.010
(0.014) (0.013) (0.019) (0.015)
EUR 0.036*** -0.030*** 0.037*** -0.027***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.006)
VAT 0.082*** -0.064*** 0.079*** -0.053***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.004)
pr man 0.045*** -0.035***
(0.007) (0.005)
pr ws 0.328*** -0.258***
(0.007) (0.006)
taylor12 0.010*** -0.010*** 0.014*** -0.013*** 0.021*** -0.016***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
taylor24 -0.026*** 0.025*** -0.025*** 0.024*** -0.018*** 0.014***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
winter 0.036*** -0.033*** 0.021*** -0.019*** 0.005 -0.004
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
summer -0.024 *** 0.023*** -0.018*** 0.017*** 0.000 0.000
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
fall -0.033*** 0.032*** -0.034*** 0.033*** -0.006 0.005
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.004)
Log-Lik. -73529.83 -65066.42 -41809.64
Obs. 78073 71218 46611
Ps.-R2 0.092 0.093 11.8
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. The table reports marginal effects for the
outcomes ”price increase” and ”price decrease”, respectively, setting all variables at their mean. For binary regressors,
the effect is for discrete change from 0 to 1. I additionally include but don’t report firm-specific averages of the
individual-specific variables, sectoral dummies as well as Taylor dummies for six and 18 months, respectively.
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Table 5: Ordered Probit Regressions II
(3) (4)
Increases Decreases Increases Decreases
firm-spec. robust robust robust robust
inflation 0.018*** -0.014*** 0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005)
oil 0.062*** -0.049*** 0.086*** -0.067***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011)
exchrate 0.013 -0.010 0.054 -0.042
(0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015)
EUR 0.037*** -0.027*** 0.007 -0.006
(0.010) (0.006) (0.010) (0.008)
VAT 0.079*** -0.053*** 0.061*** -0.042***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
pr man 0.045*** -0.035*** 0.007 -0.006
(0.007) (0.005) (0.013) (0.010)
pr ws 0.328*** -0.258*** 0.220*** -0.172***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.009)
pr ws (l1) 0.144*** -0.112***
(0.012) (0.009)
pr ws (l2) -0.029** 0.023**
(0.012) (0.009)
pr ws (l3) 0.007 -0.005
(0.012) (0.009)
pr ws (l4) -0.037*** 0.029***
(0.011) (0.009)
pr ws (l5) -0.038*** 0.030***
(0.012) (0.009)
pr ws (l6) 0.057*** -0.044***
(0.011) (0.008)
pr man (l1) 0.097*** -0.075***
(0.015) (0.012)
pr man (l2) -0.030** 0.023**
(0.015) (0.012)
pr man (l3) -0.107*** 0.084***
(0.015) (0.012)
pr man (l4) -0.049*** 0.038***
(0.015) (0.012)
pr man (l5) 0.063*** -0.049***
(0.015) (0.011)
pr man (l6) 0.095*** -0.074***
(0.013) (0.010)
taylor j robust robust robust robust
season not sign. not sign. not sign. not sign.
Log-Lik. -41809.64 -33535.55
Obs. 46611 38100
Ps.-R2 0.118 0.114
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. The table reports marginal effects for the
outcomes ”price increase” and ”price decrease”, respectively, setting all variables at their mean. For binary regressors,
the effect is for discrete change from 0 to 1. I additionally include but don’t report firm-specific averages of the
individual-specific variables, sectoral dummies, seasonal dummies as well as Taylor dummies for six, 12, 18 and 24
months, respectively.
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4.3. Goodness of Fit Comparison
As the last subsections show, state-dependent factors are significant determinants of the prob-
ability of observing a price change next to time-dependent elements. For an evaluation of the
different price setting theories, however, it is interesting whether a pure ”state-dependent” spec-
ification is able to outperform an econometric model containing only time-dependent elements.
To answer this question, Table 6 reports the percent correctly predicted for different specifica-
tions.25
Table 6: Percent Correctly Predicted
”Full Model” (3) Model (1) Model (2) TDP Model SDP Model
PCP overall 57.24% 53.73% 56.68% 53.02% 56.92%
PCP yit = 1 33.98% 27.56% 19.55% 23.81% 34.00%
PCP yit = −1 17.43% 20.59% 14.72% 16.26% 15.77%
Table 6 shows that the ”full model” including all state- and time-dependent variables (see
specification (3) in Table 4) predicts the actual outcomes correctly in 57.2% of the cases. This
is clearly superior compared to a model excluding all state-dependent regressors, indicated by
”TDP model” in column five of the table (53.0%). By contrast, a ”state-dependent” model
(”SDP Model”) excluding Taylor as well as seasonal dummies performs much better. In fact,
the percent correctly predicted by the SDP model of 56.9% is quite close to the performance of
the full model. This suggests that the addition of time-dependent variables does not improve
the model’s fit to a large extent. The difference between the full and the TDP model in terms
of correctly predicting price increases is even larger (23.8% versus 34.0%) indicating that the
purely time-dependent specification is especially inappropriate for analyzing the frequency of
price increases. Contrarily, in terms of predicting outcome 1, the SDP model does as well as the
full model.
A further comparison of the percent correctly predicted of specifications (1) and (2) reveals that
an inclusion of the macroeconomic variables as well as the measures of intermediate input prices
leads to a clear improvement in performance. Thus, while the firm-specific measures significantly
change the repricing probability and improve the model fit, they are not as important for the
overall performance of the model as the set of cumulative macro factors as well as the input cost
measures. The finding that macroeconomic variables seem to be more important in terms of
model fit than the firm-specific measures is not in line with some of the existing studies on price
setting using item-level data. These studies generally report a less pronounced role of aggregate
25In particular, the predicted probabilities are calculated for the three respective outcomes yit = 1 yit = −1
and yit = 0, given the explanatory variables. It is assumed that the model predicts yit to be 1, for instance, if the
predicted probability for outcome yit = 1 is highest relative to the probabilities for yit = 0 and yit = −1. The
percentage of times the predicted yit is equal to the actual outcome is the overall percent correctly predicted.
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measures for pricing. These diverging results might be related to the fact that I analyse pricing
decisions at the firm-level, which, to the extent that firms report some sort of average price
development for their products, implies a certain level of aggregation. Apparently, at this level
of aggregation macroeconomic factors are more relevant compared to price adjustment at the
item-level. A detailed analysis of this issue is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.
4.4. Assessing Sticky Plan Models
In order to assess the validity of state-dependent sticky plan models relative to their time-
dependent counterparts, a bivariate ordered probit model has been estimated that accounts
for a possible correlation between the timing of actual price changes and the updating of price
expectations. Table 7 shows marginal effects of the regressors for five outcome possibilities;
(1, 1): price increase and expected price increase, (1, 0): price increase and no change in price
expectations, (−1, 0): price decrease and no change in price expectations, (0, 1): no price change
and expected price increase, (0,−1): no price change and expected price decrease. Results from
the Wald test performed to test the independence of equations hypothesis (ρ = 0) reported
at the bottom of the table show that the null hypothesis is strongly rejected indicating that a
bivariate specification leads to a more efficient estimation.
First, as far as outcome (1, 0) shown in column three of the table is concerned, the main results
of the univariate specification given in Table 4 are robust to a bivariate estimation. While the
measure of manufacturing price changes as well as the dummy Taylor12 are now insignificant, the
remaining state-dependent variables are still significant and show the expected signs. Similarly,
results for price decreases are robust, as is shown in column four of Table 7. The first column
of the table reports marginal effects for outcome (1, 1) indicating a simultaneous increase in the
realized price and in price expectations. Overall, the results are very similar as compared to
those obtained from the univariate specification for price realizations. Most of the firm-specific
variables are significant and show the expected signs. Moreover, increases in the rate of sectoral
inflation and the Euro/USD exchange rate significantly affect the probability of observing both
a price increase and an expected price increase by 1% and 2.7%, respectively. The measure of an
oil price change is insignificant. Importantly, however, the measures of intermediate input costs
as well as the institutional dummies are highly significant and have relatively large marginal
effects. Columns five and six of Table 7 show the results for the outcomes ”no price change”
and ”expected price increase” as well as ”no price change” and ”expected price decrease”. The
results indicate that overall the determinants of price updating are very similar to those of
the actual setting of prices. In particular, deteriorations in the state of business, the expected
business development as well as decreases in the number of orders significantly decrease (increase)
the probability of observing an expected price increase (decrease). Increases in the business
volume and in orders lead to a higher (lower) likelihood of a positive (negative) change in price
expectations. Moreover, while the introduction of the Euro does not seem to play a role for the
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updating of prices, changes in the VAT rate as well as intermediate input prices are significant
and have relatively large effects. Effects of the cumulative macroeconomic variables, however,
differ somewhat to those for outcomes (1, 0) and (−1, 0). While the sectoral rate of inflation is
not significantly related to the timing of price updating, cumulative changes in the exchange rate
are significant and have the expected sign. Surprisingly, an increase in the cumulative rate of
change in the price of oil leads to a lower probability of observing an increase in expected price
changes. Arguably, however, it is not clear whether an increase in the price of oil is related to
a negative supply or a positive demand shock. In the case of an adverse supply shock, expected
negative effects on economic activity could offset upward pressures on expected future prices
via a reduced world demand thereby leading to the observed negative (positive) effects on the
probability of observing an increase (decrease) in price expectations.
Overall, the main conclusion resulting from the bivariate specification is that the underlying
determinants of price updating are very similar to those of the price setting process.26 In
particular, next to time-dependent variables, most of the factors characterizing the state of
the firm as well as the state of the economy are highly significant and show the expected signs.
Thus, while these findings are in line with, for instance, the sticky plan model of Burstein (2006)
assuming a state-dependent process of price updating, time-dependent sticky information models
are not supported by the results.
4.5. Robustness Checks
In order to check for robustness of the results, several variations of specification (3) for price
realizations are estimated. The corresponding results are shown in Table B9 in Appendix B.
First, I include a measure of cumulative changes in the aggregate rate of CPI inflation instead
of the respective sectoral rates; the main results are robust to this variation. Moreover, results
are robust to the exclusion of the firm-specific means of the individual-specific variables. To
account for possible endogeneity of the firm-specific variables, in an alternative specification
these measures enter in first lags. The coefficients of these variables are still highly significant
suggesting that endogeneity problems associated with these variables are unlikely. Finally, the
main results are still valid if the macroeconomic variables enter as month-on-month changes. A
further robustness check concerns the variables measuring the macroeconomic situation of the
firms. Arguably, the variables that I include in the benchmark specification only represent a
certain selection of relevant factors and may not cover the entire economic environment facing
the firms. To account for this I additionally estimate a modification of specification (2) where I
include time-specific effects instead of the cumulative macroeconomic variables. Thus, dummies
for every month are included in the estimation in order to account for all relevant macroeconomic
26The main results are qualitatively very similar in a univariate regression with the probability of observing a
change in price expectations as dependent variable. Regression results are available from the author upon request.
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and institutional factors in a given month. Estimation results are given in Table B10 in Appendix
B. It can be seen that all other variables are robust to including time-specific effects. Moreover,
as in the benchmark estimation adding the variables reflecting the macro environment improves
the model fit pointing to the importance of the overall economic environment for the price
adjustment decision. Results of the Wald test reported in Table B10 indicate that the time
dummies are jointly significant at the 1% level. Furthermore, most of the time effects are
individually significant.
Furthermore, to control for possible asymmetries between the data generating process of price
increases and decreases, respectively, specification (3) is estimated using separate logit specifi-
cations for outcomes yit = 1 and yit = −1. Results are reported in columns two and three of
Table B11 in Appendix B. It can be seen that results are largely in line with those based on the
ordered probit estimation suggesting that using a symmetric specification is a valid approach.
The only exceptions are the rate of inflation, the Euro dummy as well as the oil price. While
changes in the rate of inflation are important for the probability of a price increase, the variable
is insignificant for price decreases. This result is plausible in an environment of positive inflation.
Similarly, the introduction of the Euro as well as some of the seasonal dummies are important
only for price increases.
Finally, to check for robustness of the results under a different estimation strategy, specification
(3) is additionally estimated using a linear regression model. In contrast to the ”pooled” or-
dered probit model, this method allows for an easy implementation of individual-specific effects
that capture unobserved heterogeneity. While the more structural nonlinear index models like
ordered probit lead to more efficient estimators if the distributional assumptions are correct,
estimators obtained by using the linear model are always consistent. Columns four and five
of Table B11 reports the coefficients from the linear regression both with and without fixed
effects. Qualitatively, the main results are unaffected by using a different estimation method.
Moreover, the marginal effects calculated for the ordered probit coefficients show a similar order
of magnitude as the coefficients from the linear model further reinforcing the validity of the
key conclusions stated above. Finally, a linear specification allows me to easily apply an instru-
mental variables estimation. Column six of table B11 reports the results of a two stage least
square instrumental variables estimation with the dummies indicating changes in the business
volume, expected orders and the expected business development assumed to be endogenous. As
instruments I consider first lags of the endogenous regressors.27 The results show that with the
exception of increases in the business volume, all firm-specific variables are robust to estimating
an IV specification.
27Results of the first stage regression indicate that these measures are significant and represent strong instru-
ments. Results are available upon request.
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Table 7: Price Realizations and Expectations - Bivariate Ordered Probit Regression
(1,1) (1,0) (-1,0) (0,1) (0,-1)
statebus− -0.026*** -0.006*** 0.014*** -0.021*** 0.013***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
busvol− 0.007*** -0.007*** 0.002 0.018*** -0.009***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
orders− -0.028*** -0.005** 0.014*** -0.026*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
busdev− -0.029*** -0.007*** 0.016*** -0.025*** 0.016***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
statebus+ 0.003 0.008** -0.006** -0.006 0.003
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
busvol+ 0.029*** 0.011*** -0.017*** 0.016*** -0.011***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
orders+ -0.011*** -0.018*** 0.017*** 0.013** -0.005*
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
busdev+ -0.024*** -0.013*** 0.018*** -0.012*** 0.009***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
inflation 0.010*** 0.007*** -0.009*** 0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
oil 0.004 0.048*** -0.032*** -0.059*** 0.028***
(0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005)
exchrate 0.027** -0.010 -0.004 0.043*** -0.024***
(0.011) (0.010) (0.009) (0.013) (0.007)
EUR 0.019*** 0.016*** -0.016*** -0.001 -0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
VAT 0.063*** 0.017*** -0.032*** 0.034*** -0.022***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
pr ws 0.189*** 0.130*** -0.154*** 0.041*** -0.041***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.003)
pr man 0.045*** 0.004 -0.020*** 0.045*** -0.027***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Taylor12 0.022*** 0.000 -0.009*** 0.023*** -0.014***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
Taylor24 -0.003 -0.013*** 0.009*** 0.014*** -0.006***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
winter 0.022*** -0.013*** -0.001 0.043*** -0.021***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
summer 0.033*** -0.026*** 0.001 0.073*** -0.034***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.001)
fall 0.017*** -0.018*** 0.004* 0.043*** -0.021***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002)
Log-Lik. -81859.046
Obs. 46611
Wald Test of
Independence
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. The table reports marginal effects for the
following outcomes: (1,1) - ”price increase” and ”increase in expectation”, (1,0) - ”price increase” and ”no change in
expectation”, (-1,0) - ”price decrease” and ”no change in expectation”, (0,1) - ” no price change” and ”increase in
expectation”, (0,-1) - ” no price change” and ”decrease in expectation”, respectively. All variables are set at their
mean. For binary regressors, the effect is for discrete change from 0 to 1. I additionally include but don’t report
firm-specific averages of the individual-specific variables, sectoral dummies as well as Taylor dummies for six and 18
months, respectively.
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5. Conclusion
This paper contributes to the empirical literature on price setting by analyzing three main
questions concerning the price setting and updating behaviour of German retail firms using a
new firm-level dataset over the period 1991-2006. The first main issue addressed is whether
the price adjustment decision by firms is driven by time- or state-dependence. Regressing the
price adjustment probability not only on time-dependent and macroeconomic variables but also
on factors characterizing the individual-specific condition of firms, I find that next to time-
dependent variables such as Taylor dummies most state-dependent factors significantly change
the repricing probability. Cumulative changes in the sectoral rate of inflation and the oil price
as well as the introduction of the Euro or changes in the VAT rate significantly affect the
timing of price adjustment. Moreover, most of the variables describing the specific state of
the firm turn out to be highly significant. For instance, deteriorations in the state of business
or the expected business development as well as decreases in orders significantly decrease the
probability to observe a price increase and, vice versa, raise the chance of a price decrease.
This confirms the important role of state-dependence for price adjustment. Moreover, simple
goodness of fit measures of different model specifications show that a purely time-dependent
specification performs poorly relative to a model including state-dependent measures. This is
not in line with standard time-dependent theories a` la Calvo (1983) or Taylor (1980). Instead,
the results suggest that price setting models should endogenize the timing of price adjustment
to realistically predict the effects of monetary policy as is done by, for instance, Dotsey et al.
(1999) or Golosov and Lucas (2007).
With respect to the importance of intermediate variables, regression results show first, that
input price variability is indeed a relevant determinant for price adjustment in retail. Explic-
itly modeling the transmission of price shocks through the chain of production is thus a valid
approach. However, regression results show that it takes time for retail prices to adjust to in-
put cost changes suggesting that there is ”additional rigidity” at the retail level. This is not
accounted for in pricing models with an explicit production structure such as Basu (1995) or
Huang and Liu (2001).
Finally, using a bivariate specification that accounts for the correlation between the setting of
actual prices and price plans, I find that changes in price expectations are driven by similar
factors as changes in actual prices. Most of the firm-specific variables, macroeconomic measures
as well as institutional dummies are highly significant and economically important. This implies
that sticky information models by, for instance, Caballero (1989) and Mankiw and Reis (2002,
2006) assuming time-dependent updating of future prices are not supported by the results. By
contrast, the results are in line with the model by Burstein (2006) and Alvarez et al. (2010) that
assume a menu cost of changing plans of future prices.
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Appendix A. Data
Appendix A.1. Business Survey Data
Since 1949 the Ifo Institute for Economic Research has been analyzed economic developments
in Germany using monthly business surveys (see Becker and Wohlrabe (2008) for more details
on the variables contained in the survey). In the questionnaires firms are asked about the
development of certain key measures such as the number of orders and business volume, the
perceived state of business as well as the development of prices. A distinct feature of the survey
data is that it contains firm-specific information on expectations concerning the future business
development as well as future prices. While the data is mainly used for the construction and
analysis of business tendency indicators, the fact that the survey contains economic measures
characterizing the specific state of the individual firms allows to analyze a variety of other issues
at well. As has been emphasized in the main text, in this paper I only analyze data concerning
the retail sector. In 2003, the average number of retail firms surveyed each month was 900,
while the average response rate was about 70%. The participating firms’ share of total revenues
generated in the retail sector was about 10%. The following list gives an overview of the precise
wording of the questions asked for the variables used in this paper.
Development in reporting month:
• Relative to the previous month, our sales prices were (1) increased, (2) not changed, (3)
decreased
• We currently assess our state of business as (1) good, (2) satisfactory, (3) bad
• Relative to the previous month, our business volume was (1) increased, (2) not changed,
(3) decreased
Plans and Expectations:
• In the next three months we expect our sales prices to (1) increase, (2) not change, (3)
decrease
• In the next three months we expect the number of orders to (1) increase, (2) not change,
(3) decrease
• In the next six months we expect our business development to be (1) more favourable, (2)
not changed, (3) less favourable
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In order to judge to what extent the business surveys capture the price developments actually
realized by the firms, it is important to know who actually answers the questionnaires. According
to Abberger et al. (2009), for small and medium-sized firms, in almost 90% of the cases the
surveys are answered by the firm owner, the CEO or another member of the company’s board.
In the case of large firms, almost 70% of the survey are answered by the latter group while in
about 20% of the cases the questions are answered by department managers (see Figure A.14).
Moreover, as can be seen in the figure, if firms are asked in which department of the company the
questionnaires are filled out, about 90% of small and medium-sized firms report ”management”.
For large firms, the questionnaires are answered within the management department in almost
80% of the cases. Thus, overall, the questionnaires are answered at a very high level of expertise
suggesting that they reliably reflect actual price developments.
A final issue concerns the price development reported by multi-product firms. Arguably, the
inclusion of multi-product firms in the survey may lead to an upward bias of the frequency of
price changes. For instance, in an extreme case a firm may report a price change even though
only the price of one major product has been adjusted. In the survey, this problem is mitigated
because multi-product firms are asked to fill out several questionnaires for different product
groups. To the extent that firms still have to cluster several sub-products within the same re-
porting category, about half of the respondents report the average price development of all their
products (43.3%) or give information on prices of their most important products in terms of
business volume (44.6%). Only 10% report the price devlopment of their main product, while
3.7% use other practices in reporting their price development (Abberger et al., 2009).
Figure A.2: Position of the person and department in charge of answering the questionnaires
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Left panel, question asked : Which position does the person in charge of answering the questionnaire have in
your company? Right panel, question asked: In which department of your company is the survey usually
answered?. Since firms may report several departements, percentages don’t always add up to 100.
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Appendix A.2. Accounting for Sales
The survey dataset does not contain information on whether a price change is related to tem-
porary sales. I account for the existence of temporary sales in the data by using a ”sales filter”
proposed in the literature. In particular, I identify these price changes by looking for ”V-shaped”
patterns in the data using a ”sale filter” similar to the one proposed by Nakamura and Steinsson
(2008a). A price change is labeled ”sale” if there is a one-time price decrease that is followed by
a price increase. I define different windows for the time it takes for a decrease to be followed by
an increase; I consider one to three months, labeled as window 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Once
price changes related to sales are identified by the filter, they are removed by assigning these
observations to the group of ”no changes”. Observations indicating a price decrease (-1) due to
a sale are thus replaced by (0). For a detailed discussion of this approach, see Nakamura and
Steinsson (2008a).
Table A.8 displays the mean frequencies, standard deviations as well as the correlation with the
overall rate of retail price inflation of price changes for the original data as well as for the filtered
data using the sales filter with different window sizes. As can be seen in the table, removing
sales from the data does not cause changes in the statistics related to the extensive margin. The
mean frequency of price changes only decreases slightly from 27.32% for the original data to
26.7%, 26.2% and 25.86% for the filtered data using window 1, 2 and 3, respectively. Similarly,
the standard deviations for the different series are almost the same decreasing only slightly for
the filtered data. Thus, the occurrence of sales as identified by the procedure described above
is not a frequent phenomenon in our data as compared to U.S. data reported in, for instance,
Nakamura and Steinsson (2008a). Moreover, using the filter does not influence the correlation
with the rate of inflation indicating that the exclusion of sales does not alter the macroeconomic
interpretation of the results. Furthermore, regression results are robust to excluding price de-
creases due to sales.28
Table A.8: Summary Statistics for the Extensive Margin- Excluding Sales
Mean Std. dev. Corr. with
Variable (%) (%) pit
Original data 27.32 7.26 0.18
Sale filter, window 1 26.70 7.09 0.17
Sale filter, window 2 26.20 7.02 0.18
Sale filter, window 3 25.86 7.08 0.19
Notes: Sample runs from 1990:01 to 2006:01 with monthly frequency. The retail price index is obtained from
the Federal Bureau of Statistics. Lines 2-4 show results from filtered data.
28Results are available upon request.
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Appendix B. Tables and Figures
Figure B.3: Aggregated Micro Retail Price Data and Retail Price Index
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Figure B.4: Aggregated Micro Retail Price Data and Retail Price Index - Sectors
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Table B.9: Robustness Checks - Ordered Probit Regressions, Price Realizations
(3a) (3b) (3c) (3d)
Incr Decr Incr Decr Incr Decr Incr Decr
statebus− -0.031*** 0.025*** -0.036*** 0.029*** -0.030*** 0.025*** -0.014*** 0.012***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
busvol− -0.003 0.002 -0.001 0.001 -0.005 0.004 0.027*** -0.021***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
orders− -0.032*** 0.025*** -0.040*** 0.033*** -0.030*** 0.024*** -0.037*** 0.030***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
busdev− -0.035*** 0.029*** -0.040*** 0.033*** -0.033*** 0.028*** -0.033*** 0.027***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
statebus+ 0.015** -0.011** 0.021*** -0.016*** 0.012* -0.010* 0.008 -0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
busvol+ 0.038*** -0.029*** 0.042*** -0.032*** 0.035*** -0.027*** 0.027*** -0.021***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
orders+ -0.031*** 0.026*** -0.019*** 0.015*** -0.029*** 0.025*** -0.016** 0.013**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
busdev+ -0.038*** 0.032*** -0.030*** 0.025*** -0.040*** 0.035*** -0.036*** 0.031***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
inflation 0.018*** -0.014*** 0.017*** -0.013*** 0.044*** -0.035*** 0.292*** -0.233***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.005) (0.041) (0.033)
oil 0.062*** -0.049*** 0.052*** -0.041*** 0.004** -0.003** 0.046*** -0.037***
(0.013) (0.011) (0.013) (0.011) (0.002) (0.002) (0.015) (0.012)
exchrate 0.019 -0.015 0.022 -0.017 -0.001 0.001* 0.030* -0.024
(0.019) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015) (0.001) (0.001) (0.019) (0.015)
EUR 0.037*** -0.027*** 0.037*** -0.027*** 0.037*** -0.027*** 0.035*** -0.026***
(0.010) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006) (0.009) (0.006)
VAT 0.079*** -0.053*** 0.078*** -0.053*** 0.074*** -0.051*** 0.077*** -0.053***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
pr ws 0.318*** -0.249*** 0.333*** -0.263*** 0.315*** -0.251*** 0.321*** -0.257***
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
pr man 0.045*** -0.035*** 0.043*** -0.034*** 0.048*** -0.038*** 0.043*** -0.034***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)
Taylor12 0.019*** -0.014*** 0.022*** -0.017*** 0.019*** -0.015*** 0.021*** -0.016***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
Taylor24 -0.020*** 0.016*** -0.015*** 0.012*** -0.016*** 0.013*** -0.017*** 0.014***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
winter 0.007 -0.005 0.003 -0.002 0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
summer 0.000 0.000 -0.003 0.002 0.005 -0.004 0.003 -0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
fall -0.006 0.005 -0.008 0.006 -0.008* 0.006* 0.003 -0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Log.-Lik. -41420 -41882 -40953 -4182
Obs. 46611 46611 45683 45683
Ps.-R2 0.126 0.116 0.117 0.114
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. The table reports marginal effects for the
outcomes ”price increase” and ”price decrease”, respectively, setting all variables at their mean. For binary regressors,
the effect is for discrete change from 0 to 1. I additionally include but don’t report firm-specific averages of the individual-
specific variables, sectoral dummies as well as Taylor dummies for six and 18 months, respectively. (3a): including the
cumulative rate of change of the aggregate rate of CPI inflation, (3b): excluding firm-specific means of idiosyncratic
variables, (3c): idiosyncratic variables enter in first lags, (3d): macroeconomic variables included as month-on-month
changes.
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Table B.10: Robustness Checks - Ordered Probit Regressions, Including Time-Specific Effects
Including time-specific effects
Incr Decr
statebus− -0.026*** 0.021***
(0.004) (0.003)
busvol − -0.038*** 0.031***
(0.005) (0.004)
orders− -0.030*** 0.025***
(0.004) (0.004)
busdev− -0.032*** 0.026***
(0.004) (0.004)
statebus+ 0.011* -0.009*
(0.006) (0.005)
busvol+ 0.002 -0.002
(0.005) (0.004)
orders+ -0.039*** 0.034***
(0.007) (0.007)
busdev+ -0.036*** 0.032***
(0.006) (0.006)
pr ws 0.284*** -0.229***
(0.008) (0.006)
pr m 0.109*** -0.088***
(0.041) (0.033)
Taylor12 0.014*** -0.011***
(0.004) (0.003)
Taylor6 0.000 0.000
(0.004) (0.003)
summer -0.079 0.070
(0.048) (0.047)
winter 0.095** -0.068**
(0.044) (0.028)
fall 0.086* -0.063*
(0.049) (0.032)
Log-Lik. -45352.474
Obs. 50904
Ps.-R2 0.145
Wald Test of
Joint Sign.
Prob > chi2 = 0.0000
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, *p<0.1. The table reports marginal effects for the
outcomes ”price increase” and ”price decrease”, respectively, setting all variables at their mean. For binary regressors,
the effect is for discrete change from 0 to 1. I additionally include but don’t report firm-specific averages of the
individual-specific variables, sectoral dummies as well as Taylor dummies for six and 18 months, respectively. Moreover,
time-specific effects are included.
34
Table B.11: Different Estimation Methods - Price Realizations
Logit Linear Regression
Increases Decreases Pooled Fixed Effects IV Regression
statebus− -0.025*** 0.031*** -0.064*** -0.047*** -0.049*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.026)
busvol− -0.003 0.002 -0.002 -0.018*** 0.149**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.070)
orders− -0.022*** 0.035*** -0.069*** -0.036*** -0.167***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.021)
busdev− -0.015** 0.044*** -0.069*** -0.032*** -0.130***
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.020)
statebus+ 0.025*** 0.009 0.032*** 0.024** 0.651**
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.028)
busvol+ 0.028*** -0.037*** 0.071*** 0.028*** 0.023
(0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.007) (0.100)
orders+ -0.015* 0.044*** -0.035*** -0.017 -0.183
(0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.030)
busdev+ -0.014** 0.053*** -0.055*** -0.022** -0.169***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) (0.033)
inflation 0.024*** 0.002 0.022*** 0.013** 0.019**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.008)
oil -0.280*** -0.253*** 0.090*** 0.007 0.167***
(0.023) (0.018) (0.030) (0.030) (0.034)
exchrate -0.022 -0.011 0.048 -0.012 0.108**
(0.031) (0.022) (0.011) (0.041) (0.044)
EUR 0.060*** -0.004 0.061*** 0.066*** 0.082***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.013) (0.013) (0.015)
VAT 0.089*** -0.039*** 0.120*** 0.096*** 0.108***
(0.008) (0.004) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010)
pr ws 0.315*** -0.212** 0.552*** 0.552*** 0.540***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
pr man 0.121*** 0.013*** 0.071*** 0.061*** 0.049***
(0.008) (0.006) (0.011) (0.010) (0.012)
Taylor12 0.122*** 0.074** 0.021*** 0.006 0.015**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
Taylor24 0.051*** 0.060** -0.027*** -0.043*** -0.045***
(0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
winter 0.031*** 0.019** 0.005 0.012** -0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.009)
summer 0.016** 0.007 0.005 0.010 -0.006
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.014)
fall -0.013** -0.003 -0.014 -0.004 0.016
(0.006) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.031)
Log-Lik. -22221 -18184
Obs. 46611 46611 46611 46611 46611
Ps.-R2 0.191 0.222 0.209 0.161 0.186
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Columns 2 and 3 report marginal effects
from a pooled logit regression for price increases and decreases, respectively. Marginal effects are computed by setting
all variables at their mean. For binary regressors, the effect is for discrete change from 0 to 1. Column 4 reports
coefficients from a linear regression. Column 5 reports coefficients from a linear panel regression with fixed effects.
Column 6 reports coefficients from a linear instrumental variables regression using a 2SLS estimator with busvol−,
orders−, busdev−, busvol+, orders+ and busdev+ as endogenous variables instrumented by their respective first lags.
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